China’s weapons transfer in the Western hemisphere by Solar, Carlos
China’s weapons transfer in the Western
hemisphere
Dr Carlos Solar
Lecturer
Department of Sociology
University of Essex
carlos.solar@essex.ac.uk
www.carlossolar.com
Pre-publication manuscript. This version may contains pre-proofs
typos. Please use the link and reference below to cite the published version.
Carlos Solar (2020) China’s weapons transfer in the Western hemisphere,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 43:2, 217-244, DOI:10.1080/01402390.2019.1659782
1
China’s Weapons Transfer in the Western
Hemisphere
Abstract. What characterizes China’s weapons diplomacy and how does
it unfold in the current security scenario in the Western Hemisphere? This
article argues that Sino arms deliveries have arrived in the region together
with the expansion of commerce and trade routes as evidenced in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East. In Latin America and the Caribbean, states
seek to buy weapons in light of contentious border hot spots and intrastate
rampant violence. China is a willful seller and, to accomplish this, it has
developed a weapons transfer policy taking advantage of the post-hegemony
of the United States. The article argues that Beijing’s successes could
reverse due to the lack of interstate armed conflict, and the less belligerent
military missions adopted by the armed forces. Yet, Chinese arms transfers
in the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the developing world reveal
a complex security governance regime where the military, industry, and
diplomatic policy communities interact.
Keywords: Foreign Policy; International Relations; Weapons Industry;
Arms Transfers.
1. Introduction
The changing political economy of the defense industry has allowed Chi-
nese conglomerates to expand globally. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America can now buy Sino-manufactured
weapons and technological know-how backed by gross economic booms and
o↵-budget expenditure.1 For many developing states, Chinese deliveries of
artillery systems, aircraft, helicopters, mortar and missile launchers are ac-
cessible, reliable, and ready-to-use.2 China’s arms diplomacy, however, con-
fronts a challenging scenario in some parts of the world. The article explores
the Latin American and Caribbean case study in order to shed light on a par-
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ticular puzzle: what characterizes China’s current arms transfer diplomacy
and how does it unfold in the context of a developing region? Understan-
ding the current strategic scenario in the Western Hemisphere advances the
argument that China’s arms transfer and foreign relations with Latin Ame-
rica are the result of a particular security and foreign policy tradeo↵. We
know so far that the United States’ post-hegemony over the region has en-
hanced the geographic expansion of Beijing, particularly in terms of trade
and investment.3 What remains understudied, however, is what this means
for the developing Americas’ security order in the post-Cold War era. The
embrace of Chinese influence has provided a mix of outcomes. The Belt and
Road Initiative enforced by President Xi Jinping cares greatly to expand
its influence in developing countries; an overall strategy also emphasized in
security and military a↵airs. Paradoxically, when it comes to building up
trade and security alliances, Latin American states have dual-channels that
benefit from simultaneous links with both sides. States can now choose from
Eastern and Western competitive international market economies that put
a range of commercial opportunities at their disposal, including weapons
suppliers.4
China has sought for conventional arms transfers to enhance military
and political friendship and alliances with countries in the developing world
including the Western Hemisphere.5 This way it has not only moved closer
to like-minded governments but has enriched the options for joint military
exercises and military training at a relatively low cost. In the last decade,
Beijing has notably invested in the modernization of the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA), acquiring technological advancements that can be con-
sequently o↵ered to its allies. China’s ‘peaceful’ military rise, however, has
raised the alarm in small and middle countries in the Asia Pacific plus the
likes of Australia and the United States. 6 To some observers, China does
not want to challenge the United States’ dominance in world a↵airs. Beijing
is said to seek cooperative relationships that would in return be beneficial
for them. Nevertheless, Sino strategic culture based on peace despite di↵e-
rences seems highly reactive. If other actors pursue policies of intimidation
through advanced military weapons, some observers argue that China will
then react.7
The article takes such a scenario into consideration and presents the fo-
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llowing discussion. It surveys China’s weapons transfer governance as part
of its foreign policy and considers how such policies reflect on global norms
of peace and cooperation. By studying the impact on Sino arms sales, we
can further understand China’s policy of reform and opening up to the world
and what role diplomacy military policy has in these developments. The first
section sets out an initial discussion on Chinese policy towards arms transfer
and the pillars of Sino weapons diplomacy. The second section surveys how
China’s weapons diplomacy has reached the Western Hemisphere. This sec-
tion explores Beijing’s arms transfer to other zones of the world in conflict or
peace situation, comparing these with the particularities of Latin America
and the Caribbean. Section four then discusses how weapons have beco-
me a national and international concern when addressing traditional and
non-traditional threats to security. The concluding section discusses what
China’s arms transfer means for understanding global arms governance, as
well as the inroads of the Eastern superpower in the Western Hemisphere
and the developing world in particular.
2. Arms sales and international security
Arms sales have a great saliency in foreign relations and international
security. A particular sale might represent a major step in the quantity
or quality of weapons being supplied to a particular buyer, which conse-
quently causes suspicion among its adversaries. Everyday diplomacy in the
twenty-first century deals with many sensitive issues, such as arms sales,
through a culture of secrecy, silent power moves, and little transparency.8 In
theory, arms diplomacy is the relation between weapons (and other forms of
security) buyers and sellers from di↵erent states, these usually have larger
political, economic and social consequences than the mere transactions of
lethal or non-lethal military goods.9 Such arms diplomacy can happen either
in the case of formal or informal diplomatic ties. Andrew Feinstein and Paul
Holden coined a typography of the arms trade including activities ranging
from government-to-government contracts, to arms tra cking involving
non-state actors.10 It is not only arms dealers backed by governmental
agencies who are usually frequent corrupt practices, but also arms sales in
the grey market, which can be part of intelligence operations, where, for
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instance, one state can distribute weapons to embargoed parties (i.e. the
Iran-Contra scandal). Black markets, they add, are arms transactions of an
illegal nature and undertaken by dealers outside international conventions
through various forms of tra cking that are punished with prosecution by
law.
What distinguishes legal arms sales is that the supply and demand side
of the equation responds to practices and actions that incorporate both
economic and political transactions. Dave Kinsella and Alex Montgomery
argue that the government-to-government transfer of small arms and light
weapons (SALW), major conventional weapons (MCW), and weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) ‘are often elements in an ongoing political-
military relationship between governments’.11 States con rely on formal
military alliances to support arms sales between them. On the suppliers’
side, a mixture of political, economic and global governance norms need
to be taken into consideration, especially if such a country is participant
to, for example, the ATT, which entered into force in late 2014. Functional
reasons drive the demand side, such as particular security strategies, while
political reasons that include seeking prestige, power and other symbolical
attitudes such as sending status messages to internal or external audiences,
are also involved.12 Light and major conventional arms are said to be an
important currency in world politics 13
For decades, states have chosen from a broad catalogue of arms suppliers
o↵ering SALWs and MCWs, with arms control and its trade only becoming
a standardized norm after some of the advanced democracies agreed to the
ATT chapters on transparency, accountability, international cooperation
and monitor compliance.14 While advanced and middle nations have ratified
and signed the treaty, the United States is only a signatory member who
has not yet ratified it. Meanwhile, China and Russia formed part of the
twenty-three abstentions that included other arms traders like India, Qatar
and Saudi Arabia, which, according to reports, had been supplying weapons
to armed opposition groups in Syria.15 Among the world’s top ten arms
producers, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have
ratified this through their congresses. China has showed support to regulate
the international arms trade and combat the illicit transfer and tra cking
of arms.16
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Arms control and disarmament are double-edged concepts. Most states
want to live in peace although also wanting to secure their sovereignty
through the means of well-provisioned armed forces and security services.
Weapons control treaties have prevented arms races, but states continue
to invest in armaments as they are distrustful of other states and violent
non-state actors. Arms control plays a big part in confidence building, and
diplomatic negotiations are regularly attended by most states, including
the most powerful.17 Nevertheless, states can avoid international norms.
Israel, for example, has sold weapons through back-channel diplomacy to
Arab, African and Latin American countries in order to improve foreign
policy objectives. Although Sino-Israel relations were normalized in 1992,
arms dealings are said to have occurred clandestinely since the early
1970s.18 The United States and other Western nations have done the same
providing arms to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel, with the Soviet Union
being linked to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and, Egypt. Both Cold War superpowers
sent shipments elsewhere to Africa, Asia and Latin America. The influx of
technologies plus more economic competitiveness has allowed nations such
as Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea and India to begin their own
armament industries. Through licensing agreements, developing countries
can replicate technologies domestically. Defense o↵set manufacturing can
provide opportunities for boosting local military industries.19
Arms sales are usually attached to some degree of controversy. In the
1980s, the United States sought to sell F-15s and F-16s fighters to Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and Venezuela, and other military supplies to Argentina,
Guatemala and Chile. Congress and various other pressure groups put up a
fight against President Ronald Reagan, arguing that the United States could
not sell weapons to non-democratic, corrupt, or repressive governments.20
Perceptions of threat to their security fueled third world countries to their
weapons self-su ciency, while other countries used weapons acquisitions
and manufacturing to improve their power status regionally (i.e. Argentina,
Brazil, Venezuela and Indonesia). Despite these e↵orts, however, before the
end of the twentieth century, no Third World country was able to develop
an industry to challenge the United States, Russia, France or Great Britain.
It was only after the end of the Cold War –and with the changes that
emerged in the international security regime– that China gradually edged
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into picture, redrawing the global arms sales economy.21 Beijing pushed
its way into global arms transfer as its military capabilities proved able to
challenge the balance of power in East Asia.22 Initially, China did not mean
to be a direct challenge to the world’s top arms manufacturers. However,
the growing market presence of Beijing-made armaments were seen by many
as part of its global grand strategy. In hindsight, China has followed a path
that the rest of the advanced nations had followed previously. Washington,
Moscow, London and Paris consolidated their arms sales policies as part
of the array of their diplomatic means which had grown extensively since
the early twentieth century. By the turn of the twenty first century, China
swapped its disinterest in global arms manufacturing and control regimes
to become a part of it.23 In developing countries this was more evident, as
China materialized its arms transfers hand-in-hand with commercial and
trade ventures.
The Implications of Weapons Transfer
Arms transfer is a multifaceted phenomenon on account of a number
of issues. Transfers can have a positive or negative impact on regional
stability depending on how this new arsenal is used and the reaction it
generates in other regional actors. Arms sales also depict a relationship
between buyer and seller, one which is fully charged with political signals.
Weapons transfer can be about simple and minimal transactions or be
large and have serious dependence implications for who is buying. 24 For
example, in 2015, president Barack Obama committed to Middle East
leaders through the provision of military assistance worth billions in arms
deals. In this way the Gulf Cooperation Council received military items
including fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, radar planes, refueling aircraft,
air-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms and ammunition,
cluster bombs, and missile systems.25
More recently, the Donald Trump administration is said to be pushing
for a plan ‘that calls for U.S. military attaches and diplomats to help
drum up billions of dollars more in business overseas for the U.S. weapons
6
industry, going beyond the limited assistance they currently provide’.26
President Trump came to o ce with a strong agenda on expediting arms
transfer processes to U.S. allies and partners. Washington recently released
the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy and the Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) export policy to allow private U.S. defense companies to
sell conventional weapons and unmanned drones directly, without having
to go through the US government.27 In Europe, the British government
has been criticized for its weapons diplomacy in relation to regimes in the
Middle East where exported weapons can be used for repression and or
against non-military targets. In most of these cases, arms sales require the
balancing of many interests both across public and private actors.
Defense contractors have secured their way into arms deliveries in many
regions, thanks to politicians. What is certain is that commercial, security
and political interests are thornily embedded in what observers currently
refer to as defense diplomacy. Studying the implications of arms sales thus
requires not only an understanding of the figures and numbers behind a
series of deliveries a seller makes to a buyer; rather, it demands new ways
to identify more pressing implications for security and political statecraft.
Recent Arms Trade Trends
The volume of international sales of major weapons between 2013 and 2017
was 10 per cent higher than in the previous five years, according to the Stock-
holm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In that period, at least 67 countries
were identified as exporters of weapons. The five largest suppliers were the
United States, Russia, France, Germany and China, accounting for 74 per
cent of all arms exports. The four year period reveals a few tendencies: (i)
the flow of arms increased to Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East between
2008–12 and 2013–17, (ii) there was a decrease in arms going to Africa, the
Americas and Europe, (iii) the United States accounted for 34 per cent of
all arms exports, (iv) China was the fifth largest arms exporter, its exports
rising by 38 per cent between 2008–12 and 2013–17. 28
According to the volume of international transfers of major weapons bet-
ween 2013 and 2017, China accounts for 5.7 per cent of the world’s share
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of arms exports. Beijing’s growing ratio and its 8.1 per cent increase in mi-
litary spending has Washington calling for ways to deter China’s growing
influence and military prowess, especially in regions of the world which are
receivers of Sino arms. 29 For developing countries, Chinese arms deals have
also mostly meant new ways of restructuring their security stances in light
of U.S.-Sino rivalry.
For China, a growing number of non-traditional security issues around
the globe have become worthy of attention (i.e. weapons of mass destruc-
tion, global warming, transnational crime, drug tra cking, environmental
pollution, financial security, communicable disease, and so on). It is the ho-
pe of the Chinese authorities that by working together with Beijing, arms
recipient nations, such as those in the Western Hemisphere and other deve-
loping regions, can help provide their own security, thus cascading beneficial
outcomes for global security.
3. China’s Arms Transfer Governance
Where does China’s policy stands in relation to global arms transfer gover-
nance and international security? Chinese statecraft for the issue of arms
transfer has grown over the last decade, and under strict central control. At
the heart of the recently restructured Ministry of Foreign A↵airs rests the
Department of Arms Control. The remit of this middle-ranked o ce rests on
four major tasks that interlink with other state o ces supporting Sino arms
policy both for domestic and foreign security purposes. The department in
is charge of:
1. Reporting on issues such as international arms control, disarmament,
non-proliferation, export control and global and regional security;
2. organizing the development of relevant policies, working with other
departments to manage related cases and organizing negotiations on
relevant international treaties and agreements;
3. cooperating with other departments for compliance of international
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treaties and agreements;
4. and, finally, guiding China’s overseas diplomatic missions on relevant
issues.
The arms control department steers China’s policy on thematic areas that
include general security and arms control issues, non-proliferation issues,
nuclear issues, chemical and biological weapons, outer space and missile
issues, and conventional arms control. Since the Cold War era, for each of
these complex subjects, China has gradually joined, either as a signatory or
as an observer, a series of international treaties.30 The Chinese authorities
have set out the governance of arms transfer in light of these three main
guidelines:
1. Exports should be conducive to the legitimate self-defense capability
of the recipient country;
2. exports should not undermine the peace, security and stability of the
region concerned and the world as a whole;
3. and, exports should not be used as a means of interfering in the internal
a↵airs of the recipient country.
The Chinese government has sought to blaze a trail of prudent politics
towards who is able to buy from them. Most notably, these need to be
sovereign states that cannot re-sell the exported arms to a third party
without consent from the Chinese authorities. Additionally, China refused
to sell arms to countries or regions under the arms embargo imposed by
the UN Security Council and declared a policy of not transferring arms to
non-state actors or individuals. 31
China has shown a willingness to both study and take active part in
relevant working groups such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE), the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), the ATT Diplomatic
Conference. Beijing also contributes to the UN Register of Conventional
Arms which reports on imports and exports of major weapons systems.
The register provides a certain degree of transparency on the global arms
trade scene and presents a systematic categorization of weapons systems
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under seven categories. According to the register, China has exported
weapons to over 30 countries, mostly in South America, Africa, Middle
East, and South East Asia. 32 This data confirms other estimations done
by independent think tanks (i.e. SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database), and by
Western governments (i.e. the U.S. World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, or WMEAT). Sino arms export policy also contemplates e↵orts
to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Although,
because China sells to many places where conflict is active (i.e. Yemen,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, among others), it is di cult to fully ensure if illicit
trade counter-e↵orts are fully respected. The UN has implemented a
multilateral approach to work with governments in ensuring the success of
combating illicit weapons trade; however, multiregional e↵orts have been
thwarted by uneven regional instabilities and lesser development in many
parts of the developing world where black markets fuel dark economies.
Finally, China is an observer of the Ottawa Convention that prohibits
the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines.
When the convention was declared in 1998, neither Beijing nor Washington
agreed to sign the accord. By the time China argued that all states had
a right to use mines to fight foreign aggressors, Beijing was by then the
world’s biggest manufacturer of landmines. What has changed since is
that a growing number of countries have extended or reconfirmed their
moratoria on exports of antipersonnel mines, including, Israel, Poland,
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Turkey. Since the early 2000s, both
Washington and Beijing have significantly increased their contributions to
international mine action programs. 33
China’s Defense Expenditure
In early 2018, at China’s 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) in
Beijing, a major military spending boost unfolded, giving an annual
increase of 8.1 per cent to drive the modernization of its armed forces.
Beijing expected to spend US$175 billion across all branches of the PLA,
with China’s military budget reflecting Xi Jinping’s desire to augment
the sophistication and reach of its military complex. Zhang Yesui, a
then-spokesman for the NPC, explained that China’s defense budget is so
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large to make up for low military spending in the past and is mainly used
to upgrade equipment and improve the welfare of its troops. 34
Worldwide, the United States leads the race on military spending with
a budget of US$ 686 billion, followed by China, and then Russia, with
about a ninth of what Washington spends in its arsenal. In terms of arms
trade, the United States also leads the way, followed by Russia and then
China. 35. Since 2010, China has bolstered a ‘coordinated development’
policy between the national defense and the economy. On di↵erent white
papers and governmental documents, the Department of Arms Control
has utilized a concept to inform the world that China is on a path of
‘peaceful development’ and has a ‘defense policy which is purely defensive
in nature’.36 This includes the elaboration of a military program that ‘it
is not directed to any specific country’, and aims to provide a ‘prosperous
society’.37 At least on paper, the Sino defense policy builds on assurances
of trust, cooperation, stability and development with the international
regime.38 In order to pursue a ‘coordinated development’ policy, Beijing’s
national defense budget uses around two per cent of the overall fiscal
budget, compared to over three per cent in the United States, five per cent
in Russia, and ten per cent in Saudi Arabia.
China also evidences a network of state-owned weapons companies that
trade in the domestic financial stock markets. Chinese military contractors
have spawned when a wave of military privatization hit the country.39
By 2012, China counted at least 1,000 state-owned military enterprises.
Among these were leading contractors such as the China State Shipbuilding
Corporation (CSSC), Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)
and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. AVIC aimed to
quadruple its sales to US 157.7 billion by 2020. Reports have accounted
for China’s top 10 defense groups listed with more than 70 subsidiaries,
including over 40 with defense-related businesses.40 Since 2017, China’s
modernization drive plus strict steering from central government has
allowed for China’s military complex to launch its first domestic-made
aircraft carrier, a guided-missile destroyer, open a military base in Djibouti,
send warships through the Mediterranean and into the Baltic Sea, try
out its newest stealth fighter, the J-20, and announce the debut of the
Dongfeng-41 intercontinental ballistic missile. Building up its domestic
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military is allowing China to both deter potential enemies in Asia and
elsewhere, while giving Beijing the chance to push its arms sales onto client
states. Although the global market share of China is still minor compared
to the United States, Europe, and Russia, the modernization of its armory
is notable and a key segment of its weapons diplomacy.
4. Weapons Diplomacy: Beijing and Washington
Former presidents, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, restructured Chinese
governance to boost national industry, including the military industry, as
an extension of their grand strategy to counter Western dominance in the
world’s political economy.41 By the mid-1970, China’s main buyers of arms
were North Korea and Vietnam. At the turn of the century the list had
expanded greatly to places where Sino interest was rapidly consolidating,
including South East and South Asia, North Africa, and Latin America.
China’s evidenced economic and technological modernization evidenced
gave the PLA a broad array of strategic options to follow in the techno-
logical military industry. As noted by some observers, ‘defense-industrial
self-reliance is regarded as indispensable to China’s security’.42 This has
served a twofold endeavor. First, it has attracted foreign capital to China;
and second, it has allowed for resource allocation to the indigenous military
complex. The relationship between the PLA and civilian authorities has
not turned out so easy. In Beijing, a growing list of domestic issues worry
the civilian elites as they need to draw resources into their banking,
health, housing, and construction sectors, plus deal with the many reforms
proposed to transform state-owned corporations.43
Military a↵airs in China, and the weapons industry by default, have
grown in balance to what the PLA can arguably demand and what the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can o↵er in return. Military capabili-
ties and the modernization of Sino geo-strategic capabilities in ground,
aerospace, and maritime arsenals are said to shed light on the gradual
accommodation of influence between the two most powerful institutions
in China: its military and the party. Scholars argue that once the PLA
reaches a degree of corporate autonomy, advancing the professionalization
of its forces, their unconditional loyalty to the ruling Party may weaken.
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The resulting shift of balance between the two will not only a↵ect China’s
own political development but also impact how China unfolds its weapons
diplomacy on the world stage.44
Between 2013 and 2017, China exported weapons to 48 countries around
the globe. In Africa, China’s arms sales record shows a collective purchase
of around 21 per cent of China’s overall arms exports since 2008. In Asia,
the main Sino arms buyers include Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
North African countries, such as Algeria and Morocco, are the primary
destination of Chinese weapons, with other Sub Saharan countries equally
eager to buy from them, such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and Sudan.45
A di↵erent story was told in the early 2000s when the United States
dominated the world arms market and China was a minor actor. In the
fiscal year 2000, at least 154 countries got contracts or deliveries with North
American arms companies. The Clinton administration reverted what was
the U.S. arms policy export rule to protect national security interests and
limit conventional arms proliferation. In contrast, Washington engaged in
a strongly-oriented commercial policy, with weapons sales and production
becoming highly globalized. The post-Cold War scenario however turned
di cult for suppliers as an excess of arms arsenals and a reduced demand
in sales made the ‘global arms bazaar highly competitive’.46 Washington’s
arms policy also entered into conflict. Exports were highly-driven by profits
made in conflict areas or from deliveries made to repressive governments,
that in turn kindled severe abuses. Rather than scrutinizing the weapons
regime, President Clinton loosened export restrictions. Consequently,
discussions to reform arms exports policy did not secure more control over
conventional arms proliferation.
John Caverley and Ethan Kapstein wonder when Washington ‘squan-
dered’ its monopoly on weapons sales.47 In the 1990s the United States
controlled 60 per cent of the global weapons market, while in 2012 it was
only about 30 per cent. Both authors argue that Washington focused on
developing expensive and cutting-edge weaponry systems, leaving space
for competitors to supply markets in developing parts of the global that
seek more a↵ordable options. In this way, Russia, China, Israel, and South
Korea grasped niche markets with their own weapon industries. Arms
transfers have a geopolitical dimension that tends to benefit seller states.
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However, a consequence of the United States retrenching from the globe
is that somehow its influence over security decisions elsewhere has also
become diminished. Washington, as well as Russia and China, can arm their
allies and compete with each other through proxy recipients of weaponry.
Washington does so in the Asia Pacific to diminish China, and in Europe to
restrain Russia. The arms embargo put on China in 1989 partially enclosed
China in order to access a smaller share of the world arms market. Since
then China has sought alternatives routes. For instance, today it is the
largest supplier of arms to Pakistan which is less interested in what Western
high-tech weaponry can o↵er, and more into medium-sized a↵ordable
arms.48
Chris Parker argues that much of the international arms trade is
still dominated by the United States because of its ability to dictate
cutting-edge technology standards.49 In fact, when countries decide to
acquire weapons systems from a competitor state, for example, Russia, the
risk of falling behind in technological assistance is greater, plus there is no
guarantee that the domestic technological capabilities of buyers will endure
the maintenance of highly advanced systems. For instance, China started
a licensing agreement with Russia in the late 1990s in order to purchase
Su-27s fighter aircrafts, however, the Sino military industrial complex
hardly benefited from short-term technological di↵usion. It was almost a
decade later that the Chinese fighter J-11, and its indigenously-produced
variants based on Su-27, made its operational debut.
Despite serious e↵orts in technological advancement, China remains
to this day in the second tier of arms producers. The top five largest
exporters of major arms in 2013-2017 were the United States (with 34
per cent of the global share), followed by Russia (22 per cent), France
(6.7 per cent), Germany (5.8 per cent), and China (5.7 per cent). China
plays a dual-role in the arms trade as it is also the second main client of
France and Germany. Only Brazil is worth mentioning as a Latin American
arms producer, exporting 0.2 per cent of the global share, similar to the
performance of South Africa, Finland and Portugal.50
On the other hand, China ranks fifth in the list of largest importers
of arms with 4 per cent of the global share, behind India (12 per cent),
Saudi Arabia (10 per cent) Egypt (4.5 per cent) the UAE (4.4 per cent).
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Latin American major importers, however, have a smaller participation in
the market, with Venezuela (1.1 per cent of the global share), Mexico (0.7
per cent) and Brazil (0.6 per cent), whose suppliers include the United
States, France and Russia. Nevertheless, Beijing’s long-term investments
in its military industry have facilitated the global di↵usion of arms deals.
Between 2008 and 2017, spending in China increased from 5.8 per cent to
13 per cent of the world’s military expenditure. Asia and Oceania comprise
the second region with the most military spending (US$ 477 billion in
2017), following the Americas (US$ 695 billion), where the United States
and Canada alone take 91 per cent of the continent’s expenditure.
Although fiscal budgets for military capabilities have diminished in the
Americas (in 2016 it was 11 per cent lower than in 2008), Central America,
expenditure of the Caribbean and South America has evidenced ups and
downs across the last decade.51 In part due to the receding economic clima-
te, Latin America remains a conundrum for China. The region represents a
smaller fraction of Beijing’s world arms sales. In 2013–17 Asia and Oceania
accounted for 72 per cent of Chinese arms exports, Africa for 21 per cent,
the Americas for 4.9 per cent and the Middle East for 2 per cent. China is
well behind the major arms sellers in the Western Hemisphere. The major
imports come from South American states that in 2013–17 took 43 per cent
of transfers in the Americas. Russia accounted for 27 per cent of deliveries
to South America, followed by the United States (15 per cent) and France
(9.8 per cent). By 2008, China had delivered US$ 41 million, however, in
2015, the amount increased to US$ 178 million. In 2016, sales topped at
US$ 36 million. Meanwhile, the think tank SIPRI did not record any sales
in 2017.
The pitfalls of Chinese weapon diplomacy in Latin America are also
linked to Beijing’ own industry limitations. The lack of cutting-edge
research and development (R&D) for military technological capability,
plus a global market share owned by Washington and Moscow, inhibits
the Sino defense industry from making considerable growth.52 For China’s
plans in Latin America this issue presents at least two obstacles. Sino
weapons diplomacy fits best with states that represent a higher military
purchase capacity in geographical areas of potential conflict. Latin America
has roughly higher per capita GDP compared to Africa, the Middle East,
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and parts of Asia, however, the absence of interstate tension has partially
undermined governments’ capacity to expand on arms purchases.
5. Western Hemisphere’s Security Scenario
The latest active conflict registered in the Americas was fought between
Peru and Ecuador in 1995 over control of a border area in the Upper
Cenepa valley. Since then, most conflict in the region has remained of
intrastate character, for example, Colombia and Peru fighting internal
guerrillas, namely the FARC and the Shining Path, respectively. The 1990s
was meant to be a decade of learning from the mistakes of previous world
conflict, especially when it came to curb the flow of arms to violent regions.
However, when leadership from advanced nations was needed, governments
in industrialized countries decided to sustain a strategic arms transfer to
developing countries, including Latin America. By 1991, the United States
had supplied 57 per cent of all arms sales to the Third World. At least since
the 1970s, arms transfers had been a key priority for Washington, with
military strategists, industry lobbyists, and government o cials believing
that arms would keep allies satisfied in volatile regions with the most
anti-American feelings.
Since the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the United States has had a
record of using its arms transfer policy as a bargaining chip to win access
to military bases in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. Also,
arms transfer had been used as an icebreaker and dealmaker in key U.S.
foreign policy initiatives. Military technology transfers and military aid
can be used as diplomatic carrots from a supplier state to obtain other
valued objectives. Nevertheless, these policies did not always incorporate
how to counter regional arms races that would fuel future conflict. As
William D. Hartung puts it, the United States had ‘no serious rival for the
dubious honor of serving as the world’s number-one arms dealer’.53 Chinese
arms sales to the Third World, on the other hand, accounted for less than
one-fortieth the level of U.S. exports. Beijing became considered a ‘rogue
proliferator’ for its sales of missile and nuclear technology to regimes in the
Middle East and South Asia.
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South American arms imports grew from US$ 472 million in 1994 to 1.3
billion in 1995 making it the fourth largest importing region in the world
with a four per cent share of the global market. The jump was attributed
to big increases in purchases from Chile (US$ 267 million), Peru (US$ 218
million), Ecuador (US$ 209 million), and Brazil (US$ 67 million). Regional
imports grew in the period 1991-1995 to seven per cent. Ecuador (72 per
cent), Chile (42 per cent), Argentina (29 per cent), and Peru (29 per cent)
had the highest growth during the period. As well, Chile (US$ 525 million),
Brazil (US$ 430 million), Peru (US$ 375 million), and Ecuador (US$ 370
million), were the most relevant arms importers between 1993 and 1995.54
By then, Beijing’s weapons diplomacy had already touched land. According
to data from the SIPRI think tank, Bolivia acquired over 50 towed guns,
D-20 and M-30, delivered between 1992 and 1993. Another 30 portable
air-defense systems (SAM) were delivered in 1995. Ecuador received 72
HN-5A type portable SAMs and launchers, and 50 Red Arrow-8 anti-tank
missiles in 1994. Peru, another buyer, received a delivery of six Harbin Y-12
light military transport aircraft.55 The Y-12 planes were used by Peru to
fly reinforcements to the Upper Cenepa Valley. Both countries used their
imported weaponry in, among other key battles, the fight over the Tiwinza
Ecuadorian military post on 28 January.
Despite both parties signing a peace process in Montevideo, Uruguay,
in February, confidence was lost and military build-up increased. Peru
increased its defense budget during 1993-1997 by an average of over 10
percent, along with the likes of Mexico, Brazil and Colombia; a trend
replicated outside the region by Angola, Armenia, Indonesia, Libya,
Namibia, Singapore, Uganda, and Vietnam. In the 1995-1997 period, South
America became the fifth largest importing region in the world, with Brazil
(over US$ 1 billion), followed by Peru, Chile, Venezuela, and Ecuador as
the main weapons buyers.56 In 1998, Peru and Ecuador agreed to sign a
peace treaty that would tackle the main areas of contention between the
countries: demarcation of the border, trade and navigation, and security
and confidence-building measures. Nonetheless, Peru’s purchase of MiG-29
fighter jets and Sukhoi bombers, raised alarms among the guarantor
nations. At the turn of the century, both Peru and Ecuador would turn
largely to Sino arms.
17
Potential hot spots of conflict remaining between distrusted states
prompted governments to keep their war arsenal updated (i.e. Chile,
Bolivia and Peru; Colombia and Venezuela), although the region’s cycle of
instability has been somewhat controlled.57 In Venezuela, for example, the
change in government to left-wing president Hugo Chávez meant a serious
disruption between Caracas and old-time ally, Washington. Venezuela
sought assistance from the East, namely Moscow and Beijing, and has
since benefited from vast weapons deals paid with the revenue taken from
state-owned corporations in the oil sector.
Since commodities depreciation hit the international market, most ac-
quiring capabilities have wound down. Caracas is also wary of its neighbor
Colombia, whose security links with the United States were consolidated
following Washington’s military aid to help fight drug tra ckers, right-wing
paramilitaries and left-wing insurgencies well since the 1960s. Since Colom-
bia does not trade arms with China, Beijing can freely sell to Venezuela
without raising any suspicion. This way, Beijing has snooped in major
intrastate rivalries across the world, for example, selling arms to Pakistan,
but not to India, which consequently relies heavily on U.S. weapons.
Such an argument drives us to entertain a further idea. China’s arms
diplomacy was thwarted in Latin America in light of a di↵erent presence
of non-state armed actors, thus, driving regular armies to focus on ad-hoc
missions and roles not necessarily requiring what China can sell. In contrast,
in the Middle East, where Beijing is a sizeable arms supplier, there is a
proliferation of selling orders for Chinese air-launched cruise missiles for
potential use against ground targets, be this state or rebel forces. Pakistan
recently bought ALCM from China and Qatar received ballistic missiles. So
far, China has sold Latin America anti-tank missiles, trainer and transport
aircraft, air search radars, and light artillery weapons. The growing trend
toward human security in the Americas is driving the most capable armed
forces towards less combat potential imports and more multi-tasking hybrid
military technologies. 58Brazil, for instance, recently announced its purchase
of the former Royal Navy helicopter carrier and assault ship HMS Ocean,
plus an order of submarines from France and aircraft from Sweden, to be
delivered by 2025.59 Brazilians are worried about the protection of natural
resources and the overall territoriality of their country, one of the largest in
18
the world.
Arms race in the region?
Arms races and military competition have been commented upon by
many students of the Western Hemisphere, especially in light of the
post-2000s boom in military spending. Observers have been wary of an
“arms race” as many argue that the weapons buying trend responds to
the modernization of old stockpiles and an e↵ort to access new military
technologies.60 The fact remains, however, that arms build-up raises ques-
tions as to whether a state’s arms capacity can deter possible aggression
from potential adversaries. In this vein, what tends to matter the most
is how a state in conditioned by its own motives and the constraints and
opportunities created by its security environment in light of variables, such
as power balances among adversaries and the information they can hold
about other states’ motives for conflict.61
The most representative case is that between Colombia and Venezuela.
Between 2009 and 2016, Venezuela acquired an air defense system and
battle tanks from Russia, plus air-radars, anti-tank missiles and anti-ship
missiles from China. Both countries have a record of skirmishes, including a
deployment of troops from the side of Caracas after Bogota launched an air
strike against the FARC guerrilla, overstepping territories in Ecuador. This
event led to the so-called Andean crisis of 2008 in which all three countries
armed their borders with tanks, troops and helicopters for a week, and a
group of countries, including the conflicting parties, met in the Dominican
Republic to call an end to the stand-o↵. Diplomatic tension between the
two countries has remained and most recently, Bogota decided to send
2,000 extra troops to protect its border due to the recent socio-political
crisis in Venezuela that has prompted a massive movement of migrants.
Brazil replicated the measure sending its military to the border.
Economic and technological relations between the industrialized nations
and the Third World is increasing the flow of conventional weapons.
However, the political repercussions of a disarrayed arms regime in Latin
America should be a matter of preoccupation for China and the main arms
suppliers to the region. Armed violence, corrupt governments, and shady
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weapons industries in the region are a risky mix for any foreign actor dealing
with Latin American buyers. What are the implications for Sino arms
diplomacy given such a scenario? How does the so-called Latin America’s
“arms race” fit into Chinese arms sales? Possible answers to these questions
unveil a myriad of underlying topics (i.e. the struggle for bureaucratic
strengthening, under-development, and human rights violations) that make
the Latin America’s security regime a dangerous place for buying and
selling arms.
Hot spots of violence
Although most observers would argue that China’s arms sales con-
centrate in parts of the developing world which are home to several armed
conflicts, the argument is equally applicable to the United States and
Russia. Half of U.S. arms deals are to states in the Middle East, which
according to the Council on Foreign A↵airs is the most critical hot spot
of conflict impacting Washington’s interests.62 Russia, on the other hand,
delivers most of its exports to India, China and Vietnam, and has also
delivered arms to the rebels in Ukraine. Washington and Moscow sell in
other conflict-ridden hot spots such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Egypt. Made
in the United States arsenals are sold in various contending places in East
Asia, mostly to its security partners in South Korea, Japan, and most
recently, Taiwan. In 2017, for example, the United States signed o↵ its first
major weapons delivery to Vietnam as part of its grand strategy in Asia
and Oceania, a move that some observers argued would purposefully o↵set
China’s growing influence.63 The point to take from these developments
is that the big weapons exporters have partnerships across the globe, no
matter if the scenario is one of conflict or peace.
In the developing Western Hemisphere, the situation has followed a
similar path. The subcontinent and the Caribbean basin are the most
violent regions in the world, with an annual homicide rate of more than
20 per 100,000 population and with an increasing trend to violence in
urban hot spots.64 Crises of violence in Mexico and Brazil, and more
recently, Central America’s spillover of criminality has governments spen-
ding increasing amounts on arming their military and police forces. The
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Mexican government received US$ 150 million in funding to help set up
more controls of its southern border to detain migrants from crossing. The
problem is that while Donald Trump blocks the U.S-Mexico border, maybe
thousands of migrants will get stuck on their way north. Migrants have had
a rough time passing through Mexico, with at least 5,000 cases of migrant
homicide in 2016.65 One of the last attempts made by Barack Obama, was
to launch the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, together
with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, and totaling US$1.4 billion
dollar in aid for political stability and economic growth. The plan aimed
to support security and governance initiatives as well as stop the economic
drivers of illegal immigration and illicit tra cking.66
In the recent wave of bloodshed hitting Central America, 77 per cent
of all murders were committed with a firearm.67 The three civil wars that
tainted the central region (Guatemala, 1960–1996; El Salvador, 1980–1992;
and, Nicaragua, 1972–1991) left the armories at the disposal of violent
non-state groups once the regular armies were downsized under the peace
accords. Most of the handguns and military-grade weapons were made in
the United States and other allies during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the
United States’ diminishing role in the Americas and subsequent vacuum has
o↵ered Asian players a gap to fill. In January 2017, the Taiwanese President
Tsai Ing-wen visited Central America and signed major trade and arms
deals.68 Unlike many parts of the world, Central America recognizes the
sovereignty of Taiwan despite the pressure imposed by China upon those
who refuse to consider it a breakaway region, as Beijing does. Guatemala,
Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay remain stubborn
allies with Taipei. Surprisingly, the Dominican Republic swapped sides in
favor of Beijing, despite the fact that Taiwan donated the Dominican armed
forces two Bell UH-1H helicopters, 90 AM General Humvees, and 100
engines valued at more than US$ 35 million.69 Taipei military donations
had also previously backfired. In the early 2000s, a large donation of assault
rifles was lost in the hands of insurgents in Nicaragua and Haiti.70
China has avoided funneling bigger arms deliveries to Central American
hot spots. As it did in North Africa, Beijing began to build stronger links
with states able to provide it with a formal platform for military aid and
alliances. In South America, China’s current development under its arms
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diplomacy has allowed Beijing to gain spaces in conflicted and peaceful
zones of the globe, similar to how the United States did before. In Bolivia,
for example, Washington landed political and security aid programs with
liked-minded governments in La Paz from the 1990s. President Evo Morales,
on the other hand, came to power with an anti-imperialist agenda and
gradually cut o↵ ties with Washington, finally expelling the U.S. Agency for
International Development in 2013. By then, China had already arrived in
Bolivia, mostly with military transport vehicles donated in various stages
from 2007 to 2010. Once the United States left the Andean country, Beijing
kickstarted a more serious arms transfer, for example, selling six Panther
helicopters in 2014 and donating 27 Tiger light armored vehicles in 2016. In
contrast to Central American countries, Bolivia is a relatively safe country
and has not experienced armed conflict since the Chaco War was fought
against Paraguay in the 1930s. After that, government defeated the alliance
of Cuban and Bolivian guerrillas led by the Marxist revolutionary Ernesto
“Che” Guevara in the mid–1960s. Since then, most military e↵orts have
been put to alternate military missions to counter drug tra cking in the
Andes. Bolivia and Peru, two of China’s arms clients in the region, are the
world’s main producers of coca leaves.
6. Conclusion
At the outset of this article, I posited the question what characterizes
China’s arms transfer diplomacy and how does it play out in the context
of a developing region? Beijing’s recent military and diplomatic shake up
revealed Xi Jinping’s desire to expand its global influence. Arms dealing
is at the center of such priority, and military, civil and private authorities
are part of such a doctrine in this era of globalization. It can be argued
that China’s arms transfers to some parts of the developing world are
characterized by a strong desire to reinforce multilateral disarmament
treaties, however, in practice, Beijing is pushing for a more aggressive
strategy to maximize its stake of the world arms market.71 In March 2015,
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei’ was asked the following at a press
conference:
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute issued a report today,
saying that China has become the third largest arms exporter. Some experts share
the view that China’s arms export has increased in recent years because China
does business with regions that some western countries are unwilling to do business
with. What is China’s response to this?
Hong replied:
Rankings in this field change every year, and opinions from various institutions
di↵er from each other. On arms export, China takes a prudent and responsible
attitude and conducts strict management in accordance with domestic laws and
regulations while complying with the UN Security Council resolutions and other
international obligations. China follows the principle of contributing to the reci-
pient country’s capability of justified self-defense, not undermining international
and regional peace and stability, and not interfering in the domestic a↵airs of the
recipient country.72
The paradox is quite obvious as many developed and developing states pled-
ge allegiance to UN’s regional disarmament process and to counter the abuse
of conventional arms. However, the expansion of China’s domestic weapons
industry is of equal notoriousness. The top sellers of armament actively
participate in illicit arms trade prevention programs, tailor their domestic
legislation, empower law enforcement, and push for international coopera-
tion. But there is no treaty that can challenge a country’s national defense
industry requirements to grow bigger and more powerful. Many weapons pro-
duced by the major exporters are di cult to regulate, most notably SALW,
which currently constitute a major problem in hot spots of conflict, such as
in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.
In light of today’s traditional and non-traditional security challenges
across the globe, the pillars of Sino arms diplomacy are not easily enfor-
ceable. 73 The capabilities that China has for deterring a buyer country
from passing imported arms to a third recipient are scarce. Of course, Bei-
jing could prevent further selling weapons to a state not complying with
such a rule. However, arms records can be erased and SALW can easily
find the black market and be resold. Also, securing that Chinese-made arms
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will not enter embargo zones seems equally di cult or implausible. China
has opposed previous UN arms embargos, arguing they do not help to sol-
ve underlying problems. Finally, deterring Chinese arms from making it to
non-state actors or individuals in regions such as Latin America, Africa, or
the Middle East, seems equally hard to do. One must query if China’s arms
trade regulations are feasible in the real world and what the implications
are for buyers around the globe.
Arguably, it seems that China’s dual tracks for approaching internatio-
nal security has them seeking both validation and active participation in the
arms control global regime. In May 2016, Chinese vice Foreign Minister Li
Baodong and U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and Interna-
tional Security Rose Gottemoeller exchanged views on current international
security, global nuclear governance, outer space security, missile defense,
non-proliferation, arms and military cooperation mechanisms. The meeting
included representatives of relevant departments, including the Ministry of
Foreign A↵airs, Ministry of National Defense and State Administration of
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense of China, as well as
the Department of State, the White House National Security Council and
the Department of Defense.74 The point to conclude here is that interna-
tional security is being redrawn by the two most powerful countries in the
world through a myriad of interested parties embedded in the military, civil,
and diplomatic policy communities. Arms transfers and the outcomes for
security in the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the developing world
should thus be positioned as part of a complex security governance regime.
Eastern and Western arms producers may wish for a global scenario where
cooperation and mutual strategic trust are extremely relevant, however, to-
day’s arms transfer regime is rather shady and highly competitive. China’s
weapons diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere is highly mobile thanks to
states willing to buy not just weaponry but to strengthen their unilateral
development and advance their strategic position in the region. In light of
the unfolding post-hegemony of the United States, it seems that sooner rat-
her than later China will rethink ways to expand its weapons diplomacy and
pursue more partners in this part of the globe.
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